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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Tala Amirfazli"
and Adelyn B. Boleman*
I. INTRODUCTION

The 2017 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to
federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression. This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh
Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of civil procedure,
statutory interpretation, and federal subject-matter jurisdiction.,
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Whether a ComplaintAsserting Claims that Could Have Been
Asserted in a PriorAction Must be Dismissed Under the Prohibition
Against Claim-Splitting.
In Vanover v. NCO FinancialServices, Inc., 2 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a complaint
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and North Carolina.
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(B.A., cum laude, 2010); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., with honors, 2013).
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1. For an analysis of trial practice and procedure during the prior survey period, see
John O'Shea Sullivan, Ashby K. Fox & Tala Amirfazli, Trial Practice and Procedure,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 68 MERCER L. REV. 1077 (2017).
2. 857 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Vanover 17.
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should be dismissed for asserting claims that could and should have been
presented in an earlier-filed complaint, an issue of first impression. 3
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit joined the majority of circuits in
dismissing the later-filed claims as violating the rule against claimsplitting. 4
The lawsuit (Vanover II) was filed in Florida state court where the
plaintiff, Karen Vanover (Vanover), filed a complaint against defendant
NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (NCO) alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),5 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA),6 and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA)7
arising out of NCO's attempts to collect consumer medical debts. 8 The
Vanover II lawsuit was filed almost one year after Vanover filed a prior
complaint (Vanover 1) against NCO asserting similar claims.9
NCO removed the Vanover II case to federal court and filed a motion
to dismiss the amended complaint for improper claim-splitting. 0 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ultimately
dismissed the amended complaint, finding that because Vanover I and
Vanover II involved the same parties and a common nucleus of operative
facts, Vanover II violated the prohibition against claim-splitting.11
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue of first impression
regarding whether Vanover II should be dismissed for claim-splitting.12
3. Id. at 836.
4. Id. at 840-43. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that several federal circuit courts
and district courts within Florida have "comprehensively analyzed the claim-splitting
doctrine." Id.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a-1692p (2018).
7. FLA. STAT. §§ 559.555-559.785 (1993).
8. Vanover H, 857 F.3d at 837.
9. See id. at 836-37; Vanover v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc. (Vanover 1), No. 8:14-cv-964-T35EAJ, 2014 WL 11103879 (M.D. Fla. 2014). In Vanover I, Vanover alleged that from April
2013 through April 2014, NCO violated the TCPA by calling her cellular phone without her
express permission. Vanover II, 857 F.3d at 836-37. NCO ultimately moved for summary
judgment in Vanover I, and one week later, Vanover filed her complaint in Vanover II,
alleging that from April 2010 through November 2013, NCP violated the TCPA, as well as
the FDCPA and FCCPA. Id.
10. Vanover II, 857 F.3d at 837. Vanover amended her complaint after NCO filed its
first motion to dismiss. Id. NCO then moved to dismiss the amended complaint, again
relying on the claim-splitting doctrine. Id.
11. Id. After NCO moved to dismiss the amended complaint, Vanover sought leave to
add additional defendants in a proposed second amended complaint, which the district
court denied. Id.
12. Id. at 840. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying Vanover's motion to join additional parties under
Rule 19, governing mandatory joinder of parties, and Rule 20(a), governing permissive
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Recognizing that claim-splitting has been analyzed as an aspect of res
judicata or claim preclusion, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately adopted the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's test for
claim-splitting, which is whether "the first suit, assuming it were final,
would preclude the second suit."1 3

The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court properly applied a
two-factor test for claim-splitting, where the court analyzes "(1) whether
the case involves the same parties and their privies, and (2) whether the
separate cases arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions."14 The appellate court rejected Vanover's attempts to
distinguish the claims she asserted in Vanover I and Vanover I. 15 The
court explained that because the parties were identical in both cases, and
because "the factual bases for both lawsuits [were] related in time, origin,
and motivation, and they form[ed] a convenient trial unit,"16 Vanover was
precluded from splitting her claims among the lawsuits.17

joinder of parties. Id. at 838-39. The appellate court found that the district court did not
abuse its discretion because Vanover failed to demonstrate that she lacked the ability to
obtain full relief from NCO without joining the additional parties and because Vanover's
failure to file a timely amendment to the Vanover I complaint to add the same additional
parties did not justify subjecting NCO to duplicative litigation. Id. at 838-40.
13. Id. at 841. The court noted that "[w]hile claim-splitting and res judicata both
promote judicial economy and shield parties from vexatious and duplicative litigation,
'claim-splitting is more concerned with the district court's comprehensive management of
its docket, whereas res judicata focuses on protecting the finality of judgments."' Id.
14. Id. at 841-42. The court added that "[s]uccessive causes of action arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions when the two actions are based on the same
nucleus of operative facts." Id. at 842.
15. Id. at 842. Vanover argued "that the operative or transactional nucleus of facts
related to her TCPA claims in Vanover I [were] limited to whether NCO placed calls to her
cellular telephone using an [automatic telephone dialing system] without her express
consent" while her claims in "Vanover II [were] distinct and relate[d] to abusive and
harassing communications in the collection of consumer debts prohibited by the FDCPA
and FCCPA." Id. The court found this distinction to be "artificially narrow" and "contrary
to the prohibition against bringing a successive cause of action arising from the same
nucleus of operative facts." Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 842-43. As the district court found, the claims in Vanover II were "based
upon the same collection efforts set forth in Vanover 1" notwithstanding the medium to
which the calls were placed. Id. at 842. Additionally, it was not important to the claimsplitting analysis that the claims in Vanover II were extended to cover an earlier time
period than that in Vanover I because all alleged wrongs by NCO "occurred consecutively
in time and prior to filing the complaint in Vanover I," therefore, the collection efforts
forming the basis of Vanover I and Vanover H arose from the same transaction or series of
transactions. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly concluded
that, even though there were additional causes of action asserted in Vanover II, the claim-
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B. Whether Federal Common Law Borrows the Doctrine of State Law
CollateralEstoppel to Determine the Preclusive Effect of an Earlier
Judgment of a Federal Court that Exercised Diversity Jurisdiction.
In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc.,18 the Eleventh
Circuit resolved a "discord" in the circuit, holding that federal common
law adopts the state rule of collateral estoppel when determining the
preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction. 19 This case arose out of a prior action (the Prior Action) filed
by an employee of General Mills, Inc. (General Mills) who was injured by
a railcar and sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) for his injuries,
20
invoking diversity jurisdiction in federal court. CSX was found solely at
fault but thereafter sought indemnification from General Mills, which
21
General Mills denied.
CSX then sued General Mills for indemnification, arguing that the
parties' Sidetrack Agreement (the Agreement) required General Mills to
indemnify CSX.22 The district court dismissed the action, finding that
because the jury found CSX solely at fault in the Prior Action, the
23
Agreement barred indemnity and the federal collateral estoppel rule
24
prohibited the re-litigation of the fault of General Mills.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the question of
"[w]hether federal common law borrows the state rule of collateral
estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a
splitting doctrine remained applicable because the claims arose out of the same
transactional nucleus of fact as those of the TCPA claim in Vanover I. Id. at 842-43.
18. 846 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2017).
19. Id. at 1335.
20. Id. at 1336. During the operation of railcars on a sidetrack, an employee of General
Mills suffered serious injuries. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In 1989, CSX and General Mills entered into the Agreement regarding the
construction, use, and maintenance of a particular sidetrack railway line. Id. at 1335. The
Agreement included a liability-shifting provision under which General Mills agreed to
assume
[A1ll risk of loss, damage, cost, liability, judgment and expense . . . in connection
with any personal injury to or death of any persons, or loss of or damage to any
property, . .. that may be sustained or incurred in connection with, . . . the
operation of [General Mills's] track mobile or locomotive power." Id. (emphasis
and alterations in original).
The Sidetrack Agreement also contains a general liability provision. . . [that]
sole
relieves General Mills of liability "for all losses arising from [CSX's] ...
negligence."

Id.
23. Id. at 1336. Collateral estoppel is defined by Georgia law to require "the earlier
judgment to have been rendered in litigation between identical parties or their privies." Id.
24. Id.
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court that exercised diversity jurisdiction [was] unclear under [the
Circuit's] caselaw" 25 after the Supreme Court's decision in Semtek
International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 26 in 2001.27 After
distinguishing between the holding and dicta of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Semtek, and considering the first precedent after Semtek to
mention this issue, 28 the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
case, holding that federal common law does in fact borrow the state rule
of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a federal
judgment in which the court exercised diversity jurisdiction. 29

25. Id. at 1337.
26. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). In Semtek, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed
a related issue of "whether federal common law adopts the state rule of res judicata to
determine the preclusive effect of an earlier judgment of a federal court that exercised
diversity jurisdiction." CSX Transp., 846 F.3d at 1338.
27. CSX Transp., 846 F.3d at 1337. The Eleventh Circuit noted that there is "confusion
in [the] caselaw" on this issue. Id. The court explained that resolution of this confusion is
grounded in federal common law, "[tihat is, regardless of whether [the court] incorporate [s]
collateral estoppel as defined by state law or apply a federal rule, [the court] appl[ies]
federal common law." Id. (emphasis in original). The court also noted that some of the
confusion in prior decisions stems from the court's use of "imprecise statements" such as
"federal preclusion principles apply." Id.
28. The Eleventh Circuit explained that in order to "parse [its] jumbled caselaw" after
Semtek, the court first has to "distinguish between the holding and dicta of a decision." Id.
at 1338. 'The holding of an appellate court constitutes the precedent, as a point necessarily
decided. Dicta do not: they are merely remarks made in the course of a decision but not
essential to the reasoning behind that decision." Id. (internal citations omitted). The
Eleventh Circuit further explained that when it has conflicting precedent, it must follow
the oldest precedent. Id. The first precedent after Semtek to mention this issue was CSX
Transportation,Inc. v. Brotherhood of Maintenanceof Way Employees (327 F.3d 1309, 1316
(11th Cir. 2003)), holding that "federal preclusion principles apply to prior federal decisions,
whether previously decided in diversity or federal question jurisdiction." GeneralMills, 846
F.3d at 1338 (quoting Brotherhood, 327 F.3d at 1316). But because the issue in Brotherhood
was the preclusive effect of a "federal question previously decided by a federal court,"
Brotherhood, 327 F.3d at 1316, and not "a question of state law decided by a federal court
that exercised diversity jurisdiction," General Mills, 846 F.3d at 1339, the discussion in
Brotherhood served as mere dicta that is not controlling precedent on the issue in General
Mills. Id. Instead, the next case after Semtek to address the issue was Palmer & Cay, Inc.
v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. (404 F.3d 1297 (2005)) where the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that "a court asked to enforce the declaratory judgment must apply federal
common law, which in turn borrows the state rule where the district court exercised
diversity jurisdiction." General Mills, 846 F.3d at 1339 (citing Palmer & Cay, 404 F.3d at
1297).
29. Id. at 1340. The Eleventh Circuit declined to resolve the dispute as to whether the
elements of collateral estoppel as defined by Georgia law were met in this case, remanding
that issue for the district court to determine. Id.
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III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. Whether a Voicemail Constitutes a "Communication"and What
Information is Necessary to Constitute a "MeaningfulDisclosure"
Under the FDCPA.
In Hart v. Credit Control, LLCs 0 the Eleventh Circuit addressed two
issues of first impression regarding the interpretation of certain
provisions of the FDCPA: (1) whether a voicemail left by a debt collector
constitutes a "communication" and (2) whether a debt collection company
provides a "meaningful disclosure" when individual callers fail to disclose
their names but disclose the debt collection company's name and the
nature of the company's business. 31 The court concluded that (1) a
voicemail will be considered a communication within the meaning of the
FDCPA if it reveals that the call was from a debt collector and provides
the recipient instructions and information for returning the call, and (2)
"meaningful disclosure" does not require the individual caller's name
under the FDCPA, as long as the caller reveals the nature of the debt
collection company's business and the name of the debt collection
company. 32
The lawsuit began after plaintiff Stacey Hart (Hart) received a
voicemail (the Voicemail) from defendant Credit Control, LLC (Credit
Control) as its first communication to Hart without the "mini Miranda
warning"33 relating to the purpose of the call.34 The Voicemail identified
Credit Control as the caller and asked Hart to return the call. 35 Hart
alleged that Credit Control violated the FDCPA by failing to provide the
necessary disclosures for an initial communication to a consumer and by
failing to provide a "meaningful disclosure." 36 The district court
dismissed the complaint, finding that the Voicemail was not an "initial
communication" under the FDCPA (and thus did not require the "mini
Miranda warning"). The court found that the Voicemail provided a
30. 871 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2017).
31. Id. at 1256.
32. Id. at 1260.
33. See id. at 1258 n.1.
34. Id. at 1258. The court acknowledged well-established precedent that "[t]he FDCPA
requires the 'mini Miranda warning' to be given in the initial communication between a
debt collector and consumer." Id.
35. Id. at 1256. The Voicemail, in its entirety stated: "This is Credit Control calling
with a message. This call is from a debt collector. Please call us at 866-784-1160. Thank
you." Id.
36. Id. at 1256-57. Hart alleged that Credit Control violated two provisions of the
FDCPA-§ 1692e(11) pertaining to false or misleading representations and § 1692d(6)
pertaining to harassment and abuse. 871 F.3d at 1256-57.
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"meaningful disclosure" to Hart because it contained enough information
37
not to mislead the consumer regarding the purpose of the call.
On appeal, there were two issues of first impression arising out of the
interpretation of certain sections of the FDCPA.38 First, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that a voicemail may serve as an initial communication
between a debt collector and consumer so long as there is a "convey[ance]
of information 'regarding a debt"' 39 to the consumer. 40 The court
explained that under the statutory language of the FDCPA, the
Voicemail fell squarely within the FDCPA's broad definition of
"communication." 41 Because the Voicemail was Credit Control's initial
communication with Hart, Credit Control violated the FDCPA by failing
to provide Hart with the required "mini Mirandawarning." 42
Second, the court held that because the Voicemail provided the name
of the debt collection company and the nature of the company's business,
Credit Control did provide "meaningful disclosure" under the FDCPA,
despite the caller's failure to identify herself by name. 43 The Eleventh

37. 871 F.3d at 1257.
38. Id. at 1257-60.
39. Id. at 1258 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2018)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1257. The court reviewed the "ordinary meaning of the statutory language"
which presumably "accurately expresses the legislative purpose." Id. The court explained
that because the FDCPA "defines 'communication' as 'the conveying of information
regarding a debt [either] directly or indirectly to any person through any medium,"' the
court "need not look any further than the statutory language of the FDCPA to decide that
the voicemail is a 'communication."' Id. While Credit Control argued that the Voicemail
was not a "communication" because it essentially revealed no more than a hang-up call, the
court emphasized that the Voicemail conveyed information to Hart that a debt collector was
attempting to speak with her and it instructed Hart to return the call. Id. at 1258. Although
the court concluded that the "statutory language [was] dispositive," the court also relied on
caselaw. Id. (concluding that similar voicemails, while not "initial communications" were
"communications" nevertheless under the FDCPA).
42. Id. at 1258. The Eleventh Circuit explained that under the FDCPA, a debt collector
is required to provide a consumer with a "mini Miranda warning" in its initial
communication with the consumer. Id. Specifically, "this warning requires that the debt
collector disclose that he or she is 'attempting to collect a debt and that any information
obtained will be used for that purpose."' Id.
43. Id. at 1259. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the "FDCPA is silent on what
constitutes 'meaningful disclosure."' Id. The court further noted that although many district
courts have addressed what constitutes a "meaningful disclosure," the courts "have failed
to reach a full consensus." Id. (holding that "meaningful disclosure" "requires a debt
collector to disclose the debt collection company's name, the nature of the business, and the
individual caller's name"); Torres v. ProCollect, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1105 (D. Colo.
2012) (holding that a "meaningful disclosure" does not require the caller's name, but instead
requires the disclosure of the debt collection company's name). The court acknowledged that
§ 1692d of the FDCPA "aims to protect consumers from harassment and abuse by
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Circuit explained that "meaningful disclosure" is provided in this regard
so long as the consumer is made aware of the identity of the debt collector,
namely the company collecting the debt. 44 But because the Voicemail
violated the FDCPA's requirements for the initial communication, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Hart's complaint and
remanded to the district court. 45
B. Whether the Local Controversy Provisionof CAFA ProhibitsDistrict
Courts from ExercisingFederal-QuestionJurisdiction.
In Blevins v. Aksut,46 the Eleventh Circuit held that while the Class

Action Fairness Act's (CAFA)4 7 local controversy exception*8 precludes
district courts from exercising jurisdiction under CAFA,49 it does not
preclude district courts from exercising federal -question jurisdictiono
even if the class action is a "local controversy."5 1 The named plaintiff and
putative class representative (Blevins) brought a putative class action
against defendant Dr. Aksut (Aksut) and a facility operated by various
other defendants, 52 arising out of allegations that Aksut recommended
and performed unnecessary medical procedures for which he billed his
patients. 53 Blevins filed suit in Alabama state court and the defendants
removed the case to federal court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331

unscrupulous debt collectors" by providing "consumers with recourse following abusive
behavior by debt collectors during the course of collecting a debt." 871 F.3d at 1258-59.
Thus, the court explained that the only information the consumer who is seeking to
complain about a debt collection company's behavior needs is the company attempting to
collect the debt. Id. at 1259. "An individual caller's name is ancillary to the debt collection
company's name and adds little value to a consumer who seeks to complain about the debt
collection company's behavior." Id.
44. Id. at 1260. Although the FDCPA states that a debt collector "may not place 'calls
without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity,"' reading the phrase "the caller's
identity" to mean the name of the actual caller would be too literal of an interpretation,
which would pull the court away from its duty to "bear in mind the fundamental canon of
statutory construction that words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme." Id. at 1259.
45. Id. at 1260.
46. 849 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2017).
47. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2018).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
51. Blevins, 849 F.3d at 1018.
52. The other defendants were as follows: Selma Heart Institute, P.C., LifePoint
Hospitals, Inc., LifePoint RC, Inc., LifePoint CSGP, Inc., Baptist Medical Center South, or
Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. Id.
53. Id.
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based on federal-question jurisdiction.54 Blevins moved to remand the
case, arguing that the local controversy provision in CAFA55 required the
district court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction and hearing the local
class action.5 6 Without any analysis regarding CAFA's local controversy
provision, the district court declined to remand to state court, concluding
that federal jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2) of CAFA was not applicable.5 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Blevins' arguments that
CAFA's local controversy provision (1) requires a district court to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over all local class actions, including local
federal-question class actions, and (2) grants state courts exclusive
jurisdiction over local federal-question class actions.5 8 The Eleventh
59
Circuit rejected both of Blevins' arguments.
First, the Eleventh Circuit held that CAFA's local controversy
exception "does not affect a district court's ability to exercise jurisdiction
under

§

61
1331"6o when the case involves a federal question. The court

explained that the language of § 1332(d)(4) "makes clear that it has no
bearing on jurisdiction asserted under § 1331."62 Instead, § 1332(d)(4)
instructs federal courts to decline exercising jurisdiction under §
1332(d)(2) when the conditions of a local controversy exist in a case where
jurisdiction is based on diversity.6 3 Because CAFA's local controversy
54. Id. In the complaint, Blevins alleged that defendants violated the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and thus, the complaint pleaded a federal
question. Id.
55. Id. Section 1332(d)(2) of CAFA "grants district courts jurisdiction over class actions
'in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000' and there is
diversity between any class member and any defendant." Id. at 1019. Under CAFA's local
controversy exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4), "district courts must refrain from exercising
jurisdiction over certain class actions that otherwise meet § 1332(d)(2)'s requirements." 849
F.3d at 1019. Specifically, CAFA's local controversy provision "instructs district courts to
'decline to exercise jurisdiction under' § 1332(d)(2) over class actions that involve local
parties and controversies." Id.
56. 849 F.3d at 1018.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1019-20.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1020.
61. Id. at 1019-20.
62. Id. at 1020.
63. Id. The Eleventh Circuit was clear to point out that § 1332(d)(4) only requires
federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2). 849 F.3d at 1019. It does
not "eliminate" jurisdiction otherwise provided for. Id. As part of this distinction, the court
explained that other "courts have held that § 1332(d)(4) is similar to abstention and does
not eliminate federal jurisdiction." 849 F.3d at 1019-20; Graphic Commc'ns Local lB v.
CVS Caremark Corp., 636 F.3d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 2011) ("The local controversy provision ...
inherently recognizes the district court has subject matter jurisdiction . . . . Thus, the local
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provision "does not preclude the exercise of any other jurisdictional
power," 64 when "the requirements of federal-question jurisdiction are
met, district courts may exercise jurisdiction over class actions, even if
they involve only local parties."65
Second, the court held that CAFA's local controversy provision does
not provide state courts with exclusive jurisdiction over local federalquestion class actions because "[n]othing in the language of § 1332(d)(4)
indicates that Congress intended to divest district courts of jurisdiction
under

§

1331."66 The court explained that because

§ 1332(d)(4) does not

"restrict [district courts'] ability to exercise other forms of jurisdiction,"6 7
the district court was not divested of federal-question jurisdiction based
on Blevins' local controversy class claims. 6 8

The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Blevins is consistent with its holding
a few months later in Hunter v. City of Montgomery,6 9 where the court
held that if subject-matter jurisdiction is based solely on § 1332(d)(2), the
district court must "decline to exercise jurisdiction" if the requirements
of CAFA's local controversy exception are met. 70 Unlike the defendants
in Blevins, who removed the case based on federal question under § 1331,
the defendants in Hunter removed the case to federal court based on
diversity under § 1332(d)(2) of CAFA. 71 Further, similar to the analysis
in Blevins, the Eleventh Circuit in Hunter also explained that even if
CAFA's local controversy provision applied, § 1332(d)(4) "recognizes that
the [district] court has jurisdiction but prevents the [district] court from
exercising it."72
C. Whether Loss from a CFAA Violation Must Be Related to a Service
Interruption in Order to be Compensable.
In Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Carmicle,73 the Eleventh
Circuit, as a matter of first impression, held that an employer's loss from
controversy provision operates as an abstention doctrine, which does not divest the district
court of subject matter jurisdiction." (alterations in original)).
64. 849 F.3d at 1020.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 859 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2017).
70. Id. at 1334.
71. Compare Blevins, 849 F.3d at 1018, with Hunter, 859 F.3d at 1331.
72. Compare Blevins, 849 F.3d at 1019-20, with Hunter, 859 F.3d at 1334. Ultimately,
CAFA's local controversy exception "do[es] not affect the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction." Hunter, 859 F.3d at 1334.
73. 846 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017).
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an employee's violation of the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 74
does not need to be related to interruption of computer service to be
compensable. 75 The court affirmed the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion to dismiss the CFAA claims, concluding that the
defendant's former employee's access of email accounts of the plaintiffs'
employees did, in fact, violate the CFAA, because the CFAA's definition
of "loss" includes costs of responding to an offense, irrespective of whether
there is actually an interruption of computer service.7 6
Brown Jordan International, Inc.7 7 (Brown Jordan) sued former
employee Christopher Carmicle (Carmicle) for alleged violations of the
CFAA, among other claims.78 Prior to the termination of Carmicle's
employment from Brown Jordan, he accessed the email accounts of
others within the company which caused Brown Jordan to incur certain
expenses.7 9 The former employers argued that their costs incurred as a
result of Carmicle's accessing of the email accounts was a "loss" within
the meaning of the CFAA.80 The district court denied Carmicle's motion
to dismiss the CFAA claim, and after a trial, concluded that Brown
Jordan did sustain a "loss" within the meaning of the CFAA. 8 1
On appeal, Carmicle argued two reasons the damages alleged by the
plaintiffs failed to meet the CFAA's definition of loss. 82 First, he argued
that the "loss" asserted by Brown Jordan did not result from an
"interruption of service." 83 Second, Brown Jordan admitted that no
damage resulted to its computers and that it did not pay any money to
remedy any computer damage. 84 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
interpretation of the definition of "loss" under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) was

74. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
75. Brown Jordan, 846 F.3d at 1174.
76. Id. at 1172-74.
77. The plaintiffs included Brown Jordan, BJI Holdings, LLC, Brown Jordan Services,
Inc., and Brown Jordan Company. Id. at 1167.
78. Id. at 1172. The other claims were for violation of the Stored Communications Act
(SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018), and for a declaration that Carmicle's termination was for
"cause" under the written employment agreement between the parties. 846 F.3d at 1172.
Ten days after the plaintiffs filed their complaint, Carmicle sued in state court in Kentucky
asserting claims for wrongful termination and breach of contract, among other things. Id.
79. Id. at 1172. Brown Jordan hired a consultant to determine how Carmicle accessed
emails and to "sweep the office building for audio and video surveillance devices." Id.
80. Id. at 1172-73.
81. See id. at 1172.
82. Id. at 1173.
83. Id.
84. Id. Specifically, Carmicle argued that the fee paid to the outside consultant and
contractor was unnecessary and unrelated to Carmicle's actions, respectively. Id.
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an issue of first impression within the circuit. 85 Ultimately, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits that the definition of
"loss" includes costs of responding to an offense, whether or not there was
an interruption of computer service. 86 Therefore, based on a plain reading
of the statute, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Brown Jordan's loss
from Carmicle's CFAA violations did not need to be related to a service
interruption in order to be compensable.8 7
III. FEDERAL SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Whether the District Court has Inherent Power to Sanction Partiesin
Civil Litigation upon Discovery that the District Court Lacks
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.
In PurchasingPower, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc.,8 8 the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, as an abuse of discretion, a district judge's use of his
"inherent power" to sanction the plaintiffs law firm 8 9 for failure
"completely to perform their professional duties to the Parties and the
Court"90 in connection with the defendant's removal to federal court.9 1
The plaintiff, Purchasing Power, sued Bluestem Brands in a Georgia
state court. 92 Purchasing Power was a limited liability company, so its
citizenship for diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was the
citizenship of each of its members. Bluestem's counsel sought to remove
the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and
emailed counsel for Purchasing Power to determine Purchasing Power's

85. Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]wo circuits have interpreted the
definition of 'loss' as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) to include the cost of responding to
the offense, irrespective of whether there was an interruption of service." Id.
86. Id. at 1174. The Eleventh Circuit explained,
[tihe plain language of the statutory definition includes two separate types of
loss: (1) reasonable costs incurred in connection with such activities as
responding to a violation, assessing the damage done, and restoring the affected
data, program system, or information to its condition prior to the violation; and
(2) any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service."
Id. This was because the statute is written in the disjunctive, thus "making the first type
of loss independent of an interruption of service." Id.
87. Id.
88. 851 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2017).
89. The Author has been a partner in the law firm that represented Purchasing Power
since 1999, but neither he nor his co-authors were involved in the case.
90. PurchasingPower, LLC, 851 F.3d at 1222.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1221.
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citizenship for diversity purposes.93 After consulting with officers of
Purchasing Power and receiving "several guarantees" from his client's
CEO, President, and Corporate Secretary that none of Purchasing
Power's members were citizens of Delaware or Minnesota (Bluestem's
citizenship), counsel for Purchasing Power responded in an email that
"we are informed by our client that none of the members of the LLC are
resident citizens of either the states of Minnesota or Delaware. We trust
this gives you the essential information you requested to assess
removability on diversity grounds." 94 Bluestem removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
attaching the email as the only evidence of complete diversity. 95 The case
was assigned to Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.96
During discovery, Bluestem sent Purchasing Power written discovery
which included requests relating to Purchasing Power's, and its
members', residency and citizenship.9 7 Purchasing Power objected on
various grounds, including that the information was not in Purchasing
Power's care, custody, or control because Purchasing Power could not
compel its members to turn over that information.9 8 After an exchange of
letters between counsel about the discovery responses and objections,
neither party nor the district court took any further steps to verify that
subject-matter jurisdiction existed.99
The district court later granted summary judgment to Bluestem and
Purchasing Power appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 100 The appellate
court noted that the pleadings did not sufficiently allege Purchasing
Power's citizenship which led to an inquiry in which the parties and the
district court realized that there was no diversity. 101 During this postjudgment inquiry, the parties discovered that one of the entities the
parties thought was a Purchasing Power member was not-it had
instead set up a Delaware corporation for tax purposes to own its
membership interest in Purchasing Power.1 02 This Delaware holding

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00258-WSD,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104919 (N.D. Ga. July 27, 2012).
97. 851 F.3d at 1221.
98. Id. at 1221-22.
99. Id. at 1222.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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corporation's membership in Purchasing Power destroyed diversity
because Bluestem was also incorporated in Delaware. 103
After the realization that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
on Bluestem's removal to federal court, Judge Duffey sanctioned
Purchasing Power's law firm under the district court's "inherent power"
and Rule 26(g)(3)1 04 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10 5 Finding
that Purchasing Power's counsel misrepresented to either the court or
Bluestem on five occasions that diversity of citizenship existed, Judge
Duffey sanctioned Purchasing Power's counsel in the amount of $582,385
in fees and costs.

06

The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that Judge

Duffey abused his discretion by applying the incorrect standard for
inherent power sanctions, failed to consider Bluestem's culpability, and
ignored that Purchasing Power's counsel conducted an investigation. 107
The Eleventh Circuit first examined the standard for "unlocking' a
court's inherent power and found that Judge Duffey applied the incorrect
standard. 0 8 The district court had used a recklessness standard and
relied on cases discussing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927109 and Rule
11110 to formulate an objective standard."' The appellate court held that
the proper standard is a subjective bad faith standard.11 2 After discussing
recent Supreme Court precedent discussing the scope of a court's
inherent power, the Court found that to sanction a party or its counsel
under its inherent power, there must be a finding of subjective bad
faith.11 3 The Court stated that if a district court is unsure whether to
sanction a party under its inherent powers, it should consider the
Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.:114 "The purpose
of the inherent power is both to vindicate judicial authority without
resorting to contempt of court sanctions and to make the non-violating

103. Id.
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (2018).
105. PurchasingPower, 851 F.3d at 1222. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the sanctions
under Rule 26 in a footnote. The court held that Rule 26 sanctions are limited to discovery
and the discovery responses and objections about Purchasing Power's citizenship were
improper. The objections were proper and Bluestem's failure to challenge the objections
signaled its agreement with the objections. PurchasingPower, 851 F.3d at 1222 n.3.
106. PurchasingPower, 851 F.3d at 1222.
107. Id. at 1223-29.
108. Id. at 1223.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (2018).
111. PurchasingPower, 851 F.3d at 1223.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1224 (discussing Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2013)).
114. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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party whole."115 Finding that there was no subjective bad faith or
disobedience by Purchasing Power and no concern for vindicating judicial
authority, the use of inherent powers to sanction Purchasing Power's
counsel was an abuse of discretion. 16
Next, the Eleventh Circuit examined the relevant evidence of
wrongdoing including the culpability of other parties.1 17 The court found
that Judge Duffey failed to afford due consideration to evidence of
Bluestem's removal burden, Bluestem's submissions to the court, and
Purchasing Power's counsel's investigation to identify Purchasing
Power's citizenship.118
With respect to Bluestem's removal burden, the court recognized that
the party removing the case to federal court is the one that bears the
burden of establishing the citizenship of the parties."1 9 Although
Bluestem carried its burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction, Judge
Duffey erred by excusing Bluestem's failure to establish jurisdiction in
discovery, which violated its responsibility to raise the issue with the
court when Purchasing Power objected.1 20 The court also found important
that in the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan, neither party
raised concerns about subject-matter jurisdiction despite the provision in
the form that asked both parties the question.121 Ultimately, after
examining all of Bluestem's opportunities in the district court to discover
the lurking problem with diversity of citizenship, the court found that
"Bluestem was either more culpable than or as culpable as [Purchasing
Power's counsel] for creating the impression that subject matter
jurisdiction existed." 22
Finally, the court examined Purchasing Power's counsel's
investigation. Judge Duffey had found that "there is no evidence" that its
counsel investigated Purchasing Power's citizenship.1 23 The Eleventh
Circuit found this statement incorrect and recited evidence of seven

115. PurchasingPower, 851 F.3d at 1225.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1225-26. The Eleventh Circuit noted Judge Duffey's illogical finding that at
the time Purchasing Power objected to the discovery request seeking citizenship
information, Purchasing Power's counsel "knew full well that [Bluestem] was considering
removal." The discovery request and objection obviously came many months after removal,
and thus, Bluestem was not considering removal during discovery-it had already removed
the case. Id. at 1226 n.5.
121. Id. at 1226.
122. Id. at 1227.
123. Id.
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instances in which Purchasing Power's counsel investigated its client's
citizenship prior to sending the email to Bluestem about diversity of
citizenship. 124 The investigation included counsel's meetings with
Purchasing Power's CEO, President, Secretary, and CFO to learn the
members and members of members of Purchasing Power, follow up email
and phone inquiries, and review of a Purchasing Power chart listing each
member and their state of residence. 125 Thus, Judge Duffey's finding that
there was "no evidence" that counsel investigated its client's citizenship
was incorrect. 126
The Eleventh Circuit concluded by stating that no party in the case
acted with bad intentions. 127 The court stated that the case demonstrates
the difficulty of applying established diversity jurisdiction principles to
twenty-first-century business organizations.1 28 A simple misstep derailed
two years of litigation, resulting in a "colossal waste of time and effort,"1 29
but to point the finger solely at the party that chose state court in the
first place and did not remove the case to federal court was an abuse of
discretion since there was a complete absence of evidence of any
130
subjective bad faith by any party.
B. Whether a Judgment Must be Vacated, and the Case Remanded, After
Discovery that the District Court Lacked Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit heard a second case in 2017 involving the
discovery that, after entry of summary judgment, the federal court lacked
diversity jurisdiction. In Thermoset Corp. v. Building Materials Corp. of
America,131 a Florida roofing contractor sued a product manufacturer and
its distributor in a Florida state court for faulty roofing products used by
the contractor on a roofing job in the Bahamas. 132 The manufacturer
removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship.1 33
After conducting discovery, the defendants filed a joint motion for
summary judgment, which the district court granted. 134

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1227-28.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1220-21, 1228.
849 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
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On appeal, like in PurchasingPower, the Eleventh Circuit noticed that
the pleadings insufficiently alleged the citizenship of the parties and
inquired of the parties. The investigation revealed that one of the
distributor's members was a Florida citizen, thereby destroying diversity
for subject-matter jurisdiction. 135 The plaintiff requested the judgment
be vacated for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, while the defendants
requested that the court either treat the distributor as a nominal
defendant to disregard its citizenship or dismiss it to preserve the
integrity of the judgment. 136 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
distributor was a real party in interest, not a nominal party that could
be disregarded, and also refused to dismiss the distributor under Rule
38
21137 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
With respect to the defendants' request that the distributor be
disregarded for diversity purposes, the appellate court found that it was
more than just a nominal defendant. 139 The court found that the
distributor's absence in the case would have put the plaintiff at risk of
obtaining inadequate relief because Florida law does not have joint and
several liability.140 Thus, without the distributor at trial, the
manufacturer could have blamed the distributor for the loss and, if the
factfmder agreed, the manufacturer would pay nothing.1 41
On the request to dismiss the distributor under Rule 21 to preserve
the judgment, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the distributor was a
Rule 19142 indispensable party. 143 The court found that without the
distributor, the court could not afford complete relief among the existing
parties under the same reasons previously announced related to Florida's
lack of joint and several liability.1 44 The court also found, under Rule

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1317.
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (2018).
138. Thermoset, 849 F.3d at 1317.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1318.
141. Id. The court rejected other arguments that the distributor was entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer and that the distributor was not involved in the design
or manufacture of the faulty roofing materials. Id. The court found that the indemnity issue
could not be addressed unless the distributor was a defendant at trial and, even though the
distributor did not design or produce the materials at issue, the plaintiff alleged that it
relied on the distributor's advice to purchase the materials thereby making it potentially
liable. Id.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (2018).
143. Thermoset, 849 F.3d at 1319.
144. Id.
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19(b), that it could not conclude "in equity and good conscience,"'1 45 that
the suit should continue without the distributor.1 46 This finding was
based on four factors including prejudice to other parties, whether a
judgment would be adequate without the distributor, and whether the
plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the entire case was
dismissed.1 47 Largely relying on the same principles supporting the
finding that the distributor was not a mere nominal party, the court
found that the case should not proceed without the distributor as a
defendant.1 48 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment in the
defendants' favor and remanded the case to the district court to be
remanded to the Florida state court to start the entire case from the
beginning. 149
IV. CONCLUSION
The 2017 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, several
of which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
While the Survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have
attempted to provide material that will be useful to practitioners by
selecting relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and
procedure in the Eleventh Circuit.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1319.
148. Id. at 1320-21. Curiously, after the Eleventh Circuit's consideration of the
PurchasingPower case where the exact same thing happened-the defendant removed on
diversity of citizenship grounds only to learn there was no diversity after conducting
discovery and the entry of a summary judgment order-it is unclear why PurchasingPower
involved extremely harsh half-million dollar sanctions against the non-removing party,
while Thermoset Corp. made no mention at all about sanctions, fault, or blame for what
turned out to be a "colossal waste of time and effort" because the district court never had
subject-matter jurisdiction.
149. Id. at 1321.

